Cournot Competition and “Green” Innovation: An Inverted-U Relationship by Lambertini, Luca et al.
 ISSN 2282-6483 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cournot Competition and “Green” 
Innovation: An Inverted-U 
Relationship 
 
Luca Lambertini 
Joanna Poyago-Theotoky 
Alessandro Tampieri 
 
 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE N°951 
 
 
 
Lambertini et al. Cournot Competition and \Green" Innovation
Cournot Competition and \Green" Innovation:
An Inverted-U Relationship
Luca Lambertiniy
University of Bologna
Joanna Poyago-Theotokyz
La Trobe University
Alessandro Tampierix
University of Luxembourg
We thank Tunc Durmaz, Vassilios Zikos and the seminar audience at the EARIE con-
ference 2014 (Milan) for helpful comments.
yUniversity of Bologna, Strada Maggiore 45, 40125 Bologna (BO), Italy. E-mail:
luca.lambertini@unibo.it
zLa Trobe University, Melbourne, Victoria 3086, Australia. E-mail: j.poyago-
theotoky@latrobe.edu.au, Tel: +61 (0)3 94791409
xFaculty of Law, Economics and Finance, University of Luxembourg, Avenue de la
Faencerie 162a, L - 1511 Luxembourg. E-mail: tamp79@gmail.com.
1
Lambertini et al. Cournot Competition and \Green" Innovation
Abstract
We examine the relationship between competition and innovation
in an industry where production is polluting and R&D aims to reduce
emissions (\green" innovation). We present an n-rm oligopoly where
rms compete in quantities and decide their investment in \green" R&D.
When environmental taxation is exogenous, aggregate R&D investment
always increases with the number of rms in the industry. Next we
analyse the case where the emission tax is set endogenously by a reg-
ulator (committed or time-consistent) with the aim to maximise social
welfare. We show that an inverted-U relationship exists between aggre-
gate R&D and industry size under reasonable conditions, and is driven
by the presence of R&D spillovers.
JEL codes: Q55, Q56, O30, L13.
Keywords: \green" R&D, R&D spillovers, emission taxation, time-
consistent emission tax, pre-commited emission tax.
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1 Introduction
The link between competition and innovation has long been debated among
economists. Theories of industrial organisation usually predict that innova-
tion should decline with competition (Schumpeter, 1942). There are several
arguments supporting the view that possession of market power should result
in greater innovative activities. First, market power may be extendable to
new products, for example, through a dominant rm's command over channels
of distribution, and so on. With the ability to extend market power to new
products, an incumbent monopolist should nd innovation more attractive.
Second, there may be a need to nance innovation internally, which puts rms
with market power at an advantage since these rms may have supernormal
prots. Third, rms with current market power typically have more resources
and thus are more likely to hire the most innovative people. Of course the
third argument is related to the imperfect capital market argument underlying
the second reason.
However, theoretical research also indicates that a monopolist can have reduced
incentives to innovate. Arrow (1962) shows that a competitor can prot more
than a monopolist from innovation, and the monopolist may be slower in re-
placing it with a superior product or process than a newcomer. This is because
the rm realising monopoly prots on its current product calculates the prot
from innovation as the dierence between its current prots and the prots it
could realise from the new product, whereas the competitor regards the prots
from the new product as the gain. As such, the larger current monopoly prots
are, the less incentive the monopolist has to innovate. Moreover, a monopolist
may regard additional leisure as superior to additional prots. This may be
3
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due to the lack of active competitive forces and thus generates an x-ineciency
eect.
The lively debate on the relationship between competition and innovation is
still open both in the theoretical and empirical literature. Theoretical works
comparing a monopolist's and an entrant's incentives to innovate also provide
mixed predictions about the impact of monopoly power on innovative eort.
Factors such as uncertainty in the innovation process and the strategic rela-
tion between new and existing products may motivate entrants to spend more
on R&D relative to incumbents. The early empirical literature showed no
clear-cut results in the relationship between market structure and innovative
activity.1 Subsequently, a large evidence showing an increase of innovation
with competition has been uncovered.2 According to these results, technolog-
ical opportunity is what largely determines innovative activity and must be
controlled for when investigating the relationship between market structure
and innovation.3
In a more recent contribution, Aghion et al. (2005) provide evidence of an
inverted-U relationship between innovation and competition. Their theoreti-
cal explanation is based on Aghion et al. (1997), a neo-Schumpeterian growth
model, in which both technological leaders and followers in any industry can
1See Kamien and Schartz (1982) for an extensive discussion.
2e.g., see Levin et al. (1985), Cohen et al. (1987), Cohen and Levin (1989), Geroski (1990),
Blundell et al. (1995, 1999). In a recent study on market concentration and innovation in
Central and Eastern Europe, Voinea and Stephan (2009) shows that competition enhances
knowledge creation.
3Some empirical work considers the possibility that R&D intensity and market struc-
ture are both determined by other market characteristics. Levin and Reiss (1984, 1988)
analyse R&D and concentration in simultaneous equations models controlling for technical
opportunity and appropriability conditions. According to Symeonidis (1996), R&D inten-
sity and market structure are jointly determined by technology, demand characteristics, the
institutional framework, strategic interaction and chance.
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innovate, and innovations occur as a step-by-step process.4 Innovation incen-
tives depend upon the dierence between post-innovation and pre-innovation
rents of incumbent rms. In this case, more competition may foster innovation
and growth, because it may reduce a rm's pre-innovation rents by more than
it reduces its post-innovation rents.
One aspect that, to the best of our knowledge, has not been considered is the
relationship between competition and innovation in a polluting industry where
R&D investment aims to reduce the environmental impact of production. This
is the purpose of the present paper. In particular, we verify the presence of
an inverted-U relationship between competition and innovation in a microeco-
nomic setting of oligopolistic competition where production is polluting and
innovation results in reducing emissions (abatement, \green" R&D). Given the
presence of Pigouvian (emission) taxation, reducing pollution would reduce
production costs.5 We present an n-rm oligopoly model where rms compete
in quantities and decide their investment in \green" R&D, and spillovers in
R&D are present. We establish the link between competition and \green" in-
novation through the variation of aggregate investment in R&D according to
the number of rms in the industry: a greater number of rms in the industry
proxies increased competition and a concomitant reduction in market power
(Sutton, 1998). We consider three dierent scenarios. First, we consider the
case where emission taxation is exogenous. Our results show a strong Arrowian
avour, i.e., aggregate R&D investment monotonically increases with the num-
ber of rms. Next we consider the presence of an environmental regulator that
sets the optimal tax on pollution. We examine both cases according to whether
4See also Scott and Scott (2014) for a more traditional IO interpetation of the inverted-U
relationship.
5The introduction of Pigouvian taxation by a regulator dates back to Keeler et al. (1971),
and has been extensively examined in the literature.
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the regulator can commit or cannot commit credibly (time-consistent) to the
taxation policy (Petrakis and Xepapadeas (2001, 2003), and Golombek et al.
(2010)). With endogenous taxation we show that the relationship between
competition and \green" R&D is represented by an inverted U. We show that
this result is driven by the presence of R&D spillovers and establish the nec-
essary conditions. The results obtained by Aghion et al. (2005) are thus con-
rmed in a microeconomic framework where innovation has the aim of abating
polluting emissions.
The paper is also related to the literature on organisational structure of en-
vironmental R&D, cooperative versus independent (e.g., Scott (1996), Chiou
and Hu (2001), Petrakis and Poyago-Theotoky (2002), Sandons and Mariel
(2004), Poyago-Theotoky (2007), and Golombek and Hoel (2008)). With this
literature, we share the assumption of R&D eorts being directed not towards
process or product enhancement, but directed towards emission reduction of
harmful pollutants. The analysis in the paper is close to Poyago-Theotoky
(2007), who examines the issue of R&D cooperation vs competition in a pol-
luting industry where two rms operate and endogenous taxation is set by a
pre-committed regulator. Compared to Poyago-Theotoky (2007), we set aside
the R&D cooperation issue; instead we consider an oligopoly rather than a
duopoly, and we also analyse the case in which the regulatory policy is time-
consistent.6
6Furthermore, the paper is related to the literature of innovation and market structure.
Hausman and MacKie-Mason (1988) argued that the actions of monopolies with regards to
third-degree price discrimination, may lead to social welfare improvement due to opening
new markets, achieving economies of scale and higher eciency and, importantly, increasing
net social welfare. Geroski and Pomroy (1990) show that innovating may be a way to obtain
market power, in particular they nd that innovation increases the degree of competition
in markets. This leads to a fall in market concentration over time and eventually to the
emergence of very few and large rms. Therefore rms innovate with the aim to become
incumbents. Etro (2004) shows that the innovative process is naturally connected to the
persistence of monopolies. Their investment in research and development would be bene-
6
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The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the
model, section 3 establishes the results and section 4 concludes.
2 The model
Consider an oligopoly market with n prot-maximising rms competing a la
Cournot-Nash. Firms supply a homogeneous good, with market demand given
by p = a Q; a being a positive constant parameter measuring the reservation
price (alternatively, the size of the market) and Q =
Pn
i=1 qi being the sum
of all rms' individual output levels qi. Production generates pollution, which
is taxed at the emission tax rate t, while rm i can reduce its tax burden by
undertaking environmental(\green") R&D, zi, to reduce its emissions. The
cost function for rm i is given by c (qi; zi) = cqi + z
2
i =2; where c is the unit
cost of production, a > c, and  > 0 is a parameter measuring the eectiveness
of R&D. Firm's i emissions are
ei (qi; zi) = qi   zi   
nX
j 6=i
zj > 0; (1)
where  2 [0; 1] represents R&D spillovers. We denote aggregate R&D as
Z =
Pn
i=1 zi and the total investment in R&D as Z
2=2: Hence rm i's prot
function is i = pqi  c (qi; zi)  tei (qi; zi), so that taxation is a linear function
of emissions. Total emissions are E =
Pn
i=1 ei (qi; zi), and the damage func-
tion is a quadratic function of emissions, D = dE2, where d is a parameter
capturing the steepness of marginal damages or, the degree of convexity of the
damage function. To guarantee interior solutions in what follows we assume
cial to society as they advance new technologies. Our paper contributes to this strand by
focussing on innovation with \green" features.
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d > (1=2n) (see also, Petrakis and Xepapadeas (2001, 2003) Poyago-Theotoky
(2007). This implies that environmental damages are not insignicant for the
economy. Finally, total tax revenue is T = t
Pn
i=1 ei, whereas consumer sur-
plus is measured by CS = Q2=2. Social welfare is dened in the standard way
as the sum of industry prots and consumer surplus, plus tax revenue, minus
environmental damages:
W =
nX
i=1
i +
Q2
2
+ T   dE2: (2)
For notational simplicity we shall dene market size as m = a  c.
We separately consider three dierent cases. In the rst case, taxation is exoge-
nous. In this scenario, there is a two-stage game where rms non-cooperatively
choose their investment in green R&D in the rst stage and compete in quan-
tities in the second stage. We then introduce endogenous taxation determined
by a regulator with the aim of maximising social welfare. In particular, in the
second case, the regulator pre-commits to the environmental policy. In other
words, the optimal emission tax does not react to rms' decisions on R&D, but
it is pre-determined. The associated game is now a three-stage game where, in
stage one, the regulator sets the emission tax so as to maximise social welfare,
in stage two, rms invest in green R&D and in stage three market competition
occurs. In the third case, environmental regulation is time-consistent. This im-
plies that the optimal tax adapts to the level of investment in R&D. Therefore,
R&D investment takes place in stage one and the welfare-maximising taxation
in stage two, followed by output competition in stage three. The equilibrium
concept is perfect subgame equilibrium with backward induction.
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3 Analysis and Results
We begin by examining the market competition stage which is common to all
three cases considered. Firm i chooses output to maximise prots
max
qi
[pqi   c (qi; zi)  tei (qi; zi)]:
From the rst-order condition, a  2qi   q i   c  t = 0, where q i =
P
j 6=i qj,
and by symmetry (i.e. q1 = q2 = ::: = qn  qi ) we obtain per-rm equilibrium
output:
qi =
m  t
1 + n
:
Notice that the equilibrium quantity does not depend on abatement directly,
but it is aected by it through taxation. The equilibrium prot is:
i =
2 (m  t)2 + (1 + n)2
h
2t

zi + 
Pn
j 6=i zj

  z2i
i
2 (1 + n)2
; (3)
and is the same in each conguration considered below.
3.1 Exogenous taxation
Consider rst the case with exogenous taxation, where, in the rst stage, rm
i chooses green R&D (abatement). Using (3), obtaining the rst-order condi-
tion and solving yields equilibrium R&D, zi = t=, equal to the unitary tax
adjusted for R&D eciency. Thus aggregate R&D is:
Z1 =
nt

;
where the subscript 1 represents the case considered. Clearly, total R&D in-
creases monotonically with the number of rms in the market: with exogenous
9
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taxation we obtain a clear-cut Arrowian result. Increased competition (higher
n) leads to an increase in aggregate R&D (innovation). Summarising we have,
Proposition 1 With exogenous taxation, there is a positive relationship be-
tween competition and \green" R&D.
3.2 Optimal pre-committed emission tax
Consider next the cases with endogenous taxation. In the second congu-
ration, the regulator pre-commits to its environmental policy. Compared to
the case with exogenous taxation, now there is a stage (stage 1) before the
R&D investment stage in which the regulator sets the emission tax so as to
maximise social welfare. Solving the associated game fully, yields the optimal
pre-commitment emission tax:
t2 =
mn

2d
 
n+ 1 + 
 
n2   1+  (2d  1=n)
n2 (1 + 2d) +  (1 + n) [1 + n (1 + 4d (1 +  (n  1)))] + 2dn [n+ 1 +  (n2   1)]2 :
Aggregate R&D is given by:
Z2 =
mn

2d
 
n+ 1 + 
 
n2   1+  (2d  1=n)
2 (1 + 2d) +  (1 + n) [1 + n (1 + 4d (1 +  (n  1)))] + 2dn [n+ 1 +  (n2   1)]2 :
A sucient condition for Z2 to be non-negative is d > (1=2n), which is satised
by assumption.
In order to obtain fully analytical results, we then evaluate the shape of the
aggregate R&D function: given Z2 is a continuous function in n, if the rst
derivative is positive for a small number of rms (say n = 1), and the limit of
the function when n tends to innity is zero; then from the Rolle and Mean
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Value Theorems7 the total R&D function entails an inverted-U shape. The
rst derivative of Z2 with respect to n when n = 1 is:
@Z2
@n

n=1
=
2dm
h
2d (1 +    2) (2 + )2 +  (16 +  (9 + ) + 2 (8 + 3))
i
h
2d (2 + )2 +  (4 + )
i2 : (4)
The sucient condition under which (4) is positive is
 > e  2   1:
Consider next the limit of Z2 and @Z

2=@n when n tends to innity:
lim
n!+1
Z2 = 0; lim
n!+1
@Z2
@n
= 0:
Therefore it is evident that the aggregate R&D function with respect to the
number of rms in the industry features an inverted U, yielding a Schumpete-
rian avoured result which can be summarised as follows.
Proposition 2 Consider endogenous taxation and a pre-committed regulator.
Suppose  > e: Then aggregate R&D presents the shape of an inverted U with
respect to the number of rms (Figure 1).
7See Apostol (1967) for details.
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0 n
Z(n)
Figure 1: An inverted-U relationship
In order to highlight the role of R&D spillovers, consider the case with no
spillovers,  = 0. Total R&D is
Z2 j=0 =
m [2dn (n+ 1 + )  ]
2 (1 + 2d) +  (1 + n) [1 + n (1 + 4d)] + 2dn (n+ 1)2
;
and the rst derivative of Z2 j=0 with respect to n is:
@Z2
@n

=0
/ 4dn (1 + ) + n2 4d2 (1 + )3 + 2d (7 +  (5 + ))+
+4dn3

2d (1 + )2 +  (3 + )

+
2dn4 [ + 2d (1 + )] + 2n2   2
> 0;
showing a positive relationship between innovation and n, that is, a clear-cut
Arrowian result.
Corollary 1 Consider endogenous taxation, pre-committed policy and no R&D
spillovers. Then there is a positive relationship between competition and \green"
R&D.
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Corollary 1 points out that the inverted-U relationship is driven by the pres-
ence of spillovers. It also provides an intuition for the result of Proposition 1,
since an exogenous tax does not transfer the eect of spillovers in the aggregate
R&D schedule.
It appears then that it is the presence of spillovers that is the main driv-
ing force for the inverted-U relationship between competition and innovation
(Proposition 2). In the absence of spillovers, rms appropriate fully the results
of their R&D, and can thus use these results towards reducing pollution and
their emission tax bill. When spillovers are present, rms suer from the ap-
propriability problem (R&D results leak out to rivals without payment) which
also erodes market share and unless they have signicant market power (i.e., a
low n) they are lead to cut on innovation expenditure, so that aggregate R&D
exhibits an inverted-U shape.
3.3 Optimal time-consistent emission tax
Consider next the case in which the regulator adopts a time consistent envi-
ronmental policy. In this case, the welfare-maximising tax rate is determined
in the second stage, after rms have set their green R&D:
t3(zi) =
m (2dn+ 1)  dPni=1 zi (n+ 1) [1 +  (n  1)]
n (1 + 2d)
:
In the rst stage rm i chooses R&D. Using the above and solving for zi yields
the total amount of R&D in equilibrium as:
13
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Z3 =
26664 m [2d (2 + 2 (n  1) + n (n+ 2dn  1))  n]n+ 2d  1 + 2 (1 + n) (n  1)2 +  (1 + n) (2 + n) (n  1) + n (2 + 2 + n)+
4d2
 
2 (n  1)3   1 + n (n+ 2 + ) +  (n  1) (n (3 + n)  2)
37775
(5)
We then verify the relationship between competition and innovation by follow-
ing the same procedure as in the pre-committment case. The rst derivative
of Z3 with respect to n evaluated at n = 1 is:
@Z3
@n

n=1
=
[2d (1 + 2 + 4d)  1] [ + 4d2 (2 + ) + 2d (4 + 2)]
[ + 4d2 (2 + ) + 2d (4 + 2)]2
 
[2d (2 + 2d)  1] [ + 2d ( (6 + 4d) + 2 (2 +  + d (4 + )))]
[ + 4d2 (2 + ) + 2d (4 + 2)]2
: (6)
Since the denominator is positive, we focus on the sign of the numerator of
(6). By collecting  and rearranging:
@Z3
@n

n=1
/  (1 + 2d)2 2d (2 + 2d  1) 4d 2d (1 + 2d) +   2d  1 + 6d+ 4d2  3 :
This is positive for
 > b  4d (1 + 2d) + 2 [2d (1 + 6d+ 4d2)  3]
(1 + 2d)2 (2 + 2d  1) > 0;
for all d > 1=2n = 1=2,  2 (0; 1).
Consider next the limit of Z3 and @Z

3=@n when n tends to innity:
lim
n!+1
Z3 = 0; lim
n!+1
@Z3
@n
= 0
so that we can conclude that there is an inverted-U relationship between com-
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petition and innovation. In summary:
Proposition 3 Consider endogenous taxation and time-consistent policy. Sup-
pose  > b. Then aggregate R&D presents the shape of an inverted U with
respect to the number of rms.
As previously, we then consider the case with  = 0. In the time-consistent
case, total investment in R&D is
Z3 j=0 =
m [2d (2 + n (n+ 2dn  1))  n]
n+ 2d (1 + n (2 + 2 + n)) + 4d2 (n (n+ 2 + )  1) ;
and the rst derivative of Z3 j=0 with respect to n is:
@Z3
@n

=0
=
 
n2   1 (1 + 6d) + 2dn2 + 2  dn2   1 (1  2d) + 4dn (2dn  2d  1)
> 0:
In the absence of spillovers there is no inverted-U relationship, instead we
nd an Arrow eect in that aggregate innovation increases with the number of
rms, similarly to the pre-committent case (and with a similar intuition). With
time-consistent policy, the inverted-U eect is again driven by the presence of
spillovers.
Corollary 2 Consider endogenous taxation, time consistent policy and no
spillovers. Then there is a positive relationship between competition and \green"
R&D.
We then compare the critical values of  in the pre-committed and time-
consistent regime, i.e., the necessary values to trigger the inverted U rela-
tionship between competition and innovation. The dierence between b and e
15
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yields:
b   e / (1 + 2d) 4d (1 + d)  42 (1 + 2d)+ 2 [4d (2 + 3d)  1] > 0;
for all d > 1=2n,  2 (0; 1). Therefore,
Corollary 3 The inverted U relationship between competition and \green" in-
novation emerges for lower values of R&D eectiveness in the pre-committment
regime.
4 Concluding remarks
We have explored the relationship between competition and innovation when
R&D investment aims at reducing polluting emissions. The problem is tackled
from a microeconomic angle, through the analysis of an oligopoly where n
rms compete a la Cournot and decide their investment in green R&D. In
the case in which environmental taxation is exogenous, we show a clear-cut
Arrowian result, according to which green innovation always increases with
the number of rms in the industry, a proxy for increased competition. With
endogenous taxation, we show that an inverted-U relationship emerges and
is driven by the presence of spillovers, irrespective of whether the regulator
follows a time-consistent policy or is pre-committed to the emission tax.
16
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